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ABSTRACT 
Pipelines and other linear structures often cover large distances across topographically 
and geologically varied ground. In the last decade, or so, geological information has 
started to become available in digital form for countries and regions. This enables a 
wide-range of users, including pipeline operators, to access interpreted geohazard 
information not only for the construction of new linear infrastructure, but also to assess a 
range of geological risks to existing linear infrastructure that might have been 
constructed before such information was available. 
 
Examples of the use of such information are discussed in relation to Great Britain's 
national natural gas and ethylene pipeline networks and the possible raising of the 
Thames Estuary flood embankment that helps to protect London from flooding. Future 
developments in the provision of geological information are discussed, including 
bespoke information systems in which the outputs are defined by the users rather than 
the information holders. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the main roles of a Geological Survey is the collection, validation and 
management of geological data that are in the public domain, that is, data acquired by 
survey and research using public money, data provided by other public bodies and data 
obtained from private owners. However, there is also a responsibility to make the data 
accessible to potential users, unless the owner (outside the public sector) has required 
that the data are to be held confidentially. Even in this case, there is usually a limit on 
the term of confidentiality. However, ‘raw’ data may be of limited use to many potential 
users so Geological Surveys provide interpreted outputs, the most traditional and well 
known of which is the lithostratigraphical map. Until about two decades ago, almost all 
geological maps (whether stratigraphical or of other types) were analogue and printed 
on paper. With the rapid development of GIS (Geographical Information Systems) 
technology and the increasing digitisation of geological data, geological survey map 
outputs are frequently produced in digital format so that users are no longer required to 
buy rectangular-shaped pieces of paper but can specify the area for which they require 
information. Indeed, many ‘traditional’ geological maps do not exist primarily in paper 
form but have to be printed ‘on demand (Culshaw et al. 2006). 
 
As the coverage of high quality, two dimensional, lithostratigraphical maps approaches 
completion at medium scale (1:25 000 to 1:100 000), it becomes possible to use this 
data set, with others, to derive a series of interpreted national maps of a range of types 
and for multiple purposes. One example of this type of output is the national geohazard 
susceptibility map. In Britain, a suite of digital maps of this type has been developed 
using the basic lithostratigraphical map as the starting point. Other data inputs (if 
available) might include a digital elevation model (to determine slope steepness), 
hydrogeological information (for groundwater conditions such as the position of the 
water table and the location of springs), geotechnical information on the properties of 
geological formations and information on known occurrences of geohazards such as 
landslides and sinkholes. Such a geohazard susceptibility system at the national level 
(called GeoSure) has been developed for the whole of Britain (Harrison & Forster 2009, 
Walsby 2007, 2008). Digital national geohazard susceptibility maps exist for swell-
shrink, landslides, dissolution, compressibility, collapsibility, running sand, abandoned 
mineworkings (excluding coal) and radon. Figures 1a & b show the national maps for 
landslides and dissolution. This system has been used extensively by different user 
groups, for example, surveyors, estate agents and potential purchasers, in relation to 
house purchase and insurers to estimate the possible financial risks to properties from 
geohazards (Culshaw & Harrison 2010). 
 
Some Geological Surveys or equivalent national organisations, have built databases of 
geohazard occurrences and of geotechnical properties. In Britain, such databases exist, 
though they are far from complete (Cooper et al. 2001, Farrant & Cooper 2008, Self et 
al. 2012, Foster et al. 2012). The landslide database contains information on close to 16 
000 landslides and the karst database on around 52 000 features related to dissolution. 
The geotechnical properties database has data on nearly 500 000 engineering soil and 
rock samples obtained from just under 100 000 boreholes and other excavations. 
Figures 2a, b & c show the distribution of landslides, karst features and samples for 
which there is geotechnical data, respectively, as of July 2012. The datasets developed 
so far are qualitative hazard maps, not risk maps. Creating true risk maps is a very 
difficult and time-consuming process. 
 
Such information sets are also useful to other users. One of these user groups includes 
the owners and operators of linear structures such as pipelines, flood defence systems, 
railways and roads. This paper describes two case studies. The first outlines how the 
geohazard information, briefly described above, has been used by national pipeline 
operators to assess the health and safety risk of pipeline rupture by landslides and 
dissolutions features. The second illustrates how a major flood defence network along 
the River Thames was assessed to determine places where excessive or differential 
subsidence might pose a risk to the integrity of the flood embankments. 
 
CASE STUDY 1 – THE NATIONAL GAS AND ETHYLENE PIPELINE NETWORKS 
As in many countries, Great Britain (GB) (which is made up of England, Scotland and 
Wales) has a large network of pipelines, carrying a range of liquids and gases, such as 
water, natural gas and petroleum products. While these pipelines were constructed 
following site investigations, at the time, information on a range of geohazards had not 
been compiled into accessible national databases. The drive to do this followed a period 
of relatively severe drought in the south east and Midlands of England in 1989-90. This 
drought resulted in a series of insurance claims for 'subsidence' damage to houses 
which cost the British insurance industry around £1bn. To enable the industry to 
understand risks better, research was carried out by the British Geological Survey 
(BGS) that resulted in the production of a series of geohazard susceptibility maps for 
most of GB (Culshaw 1993, Culshaw & Kelk 1994, Rosenbaum & Culshaw 2003, 
Culshaw & Harrison 2010). However, there were deficiencies in the geohazard 
susceptibility maps caused, particularly, by the limited availability in digital form of the 
geological and other data used to produce the maps. In the early 2000s, this resulted in 
the development, by the BGS, of a new digital geohazard susceptibility system 
(Harrison & Forster 2009, Walsby 2007, 2008). 
 
In the early part of the 21st Century, there was an increasing requirement on the owners 
and operators of pipelines carrying hazardous fluids (Major Accident Hazard Pipelines - 
MAHPs) to demonstrate the level of risk of rupture from a range of external hazards, 
including geohazards. This requirement resulted in the operators of the GB natural gas 
and ethylene pipeline networks seeking to identify those places where their pipeline 
networks might be at risk of rupture from the occurrence of a geohazard. The two 
networks were different in size, the natural gas network involving around 18 000 km of 
pipeline, while the ethylene network had about 1000 km of pipeline (Figures 1a and b).  
 
Of the natural geohazards for which ground movement susceptibility has been 
assessed (shrinkage and swelling of clay, mass movement, natural dissolution, 
compressible soils, running sands, collapsible soils), mass movement and natural 
dissolution were the two that had the greatest potential to cause pipeline rupture. 
Consequently, the assessments were carried out for these two geohazards. 
 
Landsliding includes movement of material by falling, toppling, sliding and flowing 
depending on the topography of the ground surface and the nature of the material of 
which it is composed. The impact that such movements have on rigid linear 
infrastructure, such as a pipeline, will vary but typical results include sudden impact, 
loading, longitudinal compression or tension and lateral deflection or shearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Natural gas pipeline network   Figure 1b. Ethylene pipeline network for 
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The dissolution of soluble rocks in Great Britain is much less widespread than that of 
landsliding. Britain has four types of soluble (or karstic) rocks: mainly Carboniferous 
limestone, Cretaceous chalk (the most widespread carbonate rock in Britain), Permian 
gypsum and mainly Permo-Triassic salt, each with a different character and associated 
problems (Cooper et al. 2001). Subsidence, often triggered by water or brine 
abstraction, occurs widely where soluble rocks occur, especially where soluble rocks 
are overlain by a thin superficial veneer. At the surface, the presence of sinkholes 
provides evidence of this. 
 
Dissolution of soluble rocks can cause significant engineering and foundation problems 
that may affect pipelines. The nature and scale of dissolution varies according to the 
rock type and the nature of the site. The nature of dissolution means that the hazards 
posed to linear route infrastructure such as pipelines are dominated by subsidence and 
ground collapse (sinkholes) (Waltham et al. 2005). Large-scale collapses in Great 
Britain are rare, but can involve voids greater than 30 m in diameter. Such failures 
would result in a sudden and complete loss of support to the pipeline. Smaller collapses 
are far more frequent and are unlikely to cause significant hazard to the pipeline itself 
but may still affect supporting infrastructure. Lateral movement of the ground surface 
can also be caused by dissolution. This tends to occur where solution leads to 
undermining of a thick cover of superficial materials. 
 
Geohazard Assessment System 
A system that could provide information on geohazards for the two pipeline networks 
was developed. The system had to fulfil two functions: 
 to provide a consistent, national assessment of geohazards affecting the pipeline 
networks; 
 to provide information regarding the spatial distribution and the severity of 
geohazards.  
 
Digital files of each pipeline network were provided by the operators. A buffer around the 
each network was created. For operational reasons this was set to a width of 500 m 
(250m either side of the centre-line) for the natural gas pipeline network; for the 
ethylene pipeline network two buffer zones were set at 140 m and 400 m wide (70 m 
and 200 m either side of the centre-line). These buffered networks were then clipped 
against the geohazard susceptibility dataset to produce a GIS layer indicating the areas 
of high hazard rating for the pipeline. 
 
Data from the geohazard susceptibility dataset were modified by reference to data in the 
BGS National Landslide Database and BGS National Karst Database. This showed 
areas where additional data regarding landslide occurrence have been collected since 
the original geohazard susceptibility dataset was interpreted. Delineated areas were 
incorporated into the GIS and each given a hazard rating on a scale of zero to five for 
landslide hazard and one to five for dissolution hazard (Table 1). The results were 
output as GIS layers of landslide hazard and dissolution hazard. Figures 2a and b show 
parts of the gas pipeline network that are subject to significant (moderate to high and 
high, Table 1) landslide and dissolution hazard. 
 
For each of the pipeline networks, the percentage of the length of each network falling 
in classes 4 and 5 for the two geohazards are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of each pipeline network falling in geohazard class 4 and 5 
combined and for which there was no geohazard susceptibility for the various buffer 
zones 
 
 Percentage of 
natural gas 
pipeline network. 
500 m total width 
buffer zone 
Percentage of 
ethylene pipeline 
network. 140 m 
total width buffer 
zone 
Percentage of 
ethylene pipeline 
network. 400 m 
total width buffer 
zone 
Landslide classes 
4 and 5, combined 
0.9 2.2 2.5 
No landslide 50.1 0.2 0.3 
susceptibility 
Dissolution 
classes 4 and 5, 
combined 
0.9 2.3 2.4 
No dissolution 
susceptibility 
84.2 91.1 91.1 
 
 
Figure 2. Parts of the gas pipeline network subject to moderate to high and high a) 
landslide hazard and b) dissolution hazard. 
 
CASE STUDY 2 – THE RIVER THAMES FLOOD DEFENCE SCHEME  
There are global and national concerns about the vulnerability of population, buildings 
and infrastructure on low-lying ground given the now accepted threat of rising sea 
levels, whether associated with global warming-driven climate change, increased 
storminess, or brought about by changes in coastal configuration. In addition, since the 
Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) (c.20 000 years BP), mainland Britain relieved of the 
weight of thicknesses of ice (in excess of 1000 m in the western Highlands of Scotland) 
has responded by the ice loaded areas rising (a ‘springboard’ affect) and the whole of 
Britain being subjected to a c. 120 m sea-level rise from the maximum of the LGM 
glaciation to about 6,500 years ago. Over the past 6 500 years land uplift has been 
greater than sea-level rise in the areas of substantial ice load but, elsewhere, sea-level 
has oscillated around the present level with slight subsidence occurring due to the de-
glacial melt-water load on the Atlantic basin and the continental shelf, the effect of far-
field ice sheets and local factors such as onshore and offshore geomorphology and 
sediment compaction. Typical rates of subsidence in eastern and southern Britain over 
this period are between 0.5 and 1 mm/year (Gehrels 2010). 
 
As with many global megacities, a good part of London’s essential infrastructure, 
property (500 000 residential and 40 000 non-residential properties valued at more than 
£80 billion), key government and financial institutions are located on the alluvial 
floodplain of the River Thames and its lower river terraces. In addition, London is the 
home to around 8.2 million people (March 2011 census), 1.25 million of whom are 
vulnerable to flooding of the River Thames and the Thames Estuary. These figures are 
set to increase substantially as the capital expands, this expansion extending 
particularly along the hinterland corridor of the outer Thames estuary in the 
neighbouring counties of Kent and Essex. 
 
The Environment Agency (EA) (a national government agency) in Britain has, as one of 
its responsibilities, the management of tidal flood risk through London and the Thames 
estuary. The Thames Estuary 2100 (TE2100) project was established by the 
Environment Agency in 2002 with the aim of developing a strategic flood risk 
management plan for London and the Thames estuary through to the end of the 21st 
century. The plan primarily looked at tidal flooding, though other sources of flooding, 
including high river flows as a result of heavy rainfall and surface water flooding, were 
considered. The key driver for the project was to consider how tidal flood risk was likely 
to change in response to future changes in climate and people and property in the 
floodplain. The plan covers the tidal Thames and its floodplain from Teddington, in the 
west, to Sheerness/Shoeburyness in the east. It is integrated with adjoining catchment 
flood management plans (CFMPs), which cover non-tidal flood risk management, with 
the shoreline management plans (SMPs) in Kent and Essex, which cover coastal flood 
and erosion risk management. 
 
The TE2100 Plan (Anon. 2012) recognised that the 300 km of existing Thames flood 
defence structures provided by embankments (‘soft’ defences), walls, barriers and gates 
(collectively ‘hard’ defences) were gradually deteriorating and would reach the peak of 
their design lives during the next 20-30 years (much of the defence emplacements were 
designed to protect against a 1 in 1000 year flood up to 2030 (Anon. 2009). In addition, 
less developed areas included installations constructed to lower standards and ridge 
heights. Within the City and adjacent populated and commercial area these structures 
tend to be made of concrete and steel; elsewhere, soil levees are the norm. Critically, all 
these structures are founded on potentially compressible Holocene sediments.  
 
Integral to the TE2100 Strategic Environmental Assessment was a baseline audit. The 
British Geological Survey (BGS) with other scientific agencies has been involved in 
aspects of this audit including an assessment of relative land and sea level changes in 
London and the Thames Estuary and of the near-surface geology underlying the 
estuary and its hinterland. 
 
Global Positioning System (GPS) data from the Institute of Engineering Surveying & 
Space Geodesy at the University of Nottingham, Absolute Gravimetric data from the 
Proudman Oceangraphic Laboratory and analysis of Persistent Scatterer Interferometric 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (PSInSAR) data by Nigel Press Associates has enabled 
collaborating teams (including BGS) to gain a broad picture of land deformation (in 
millimetres per year) across the Thames region as a whole. 
 
After numbers of local factors affecting ground elevation such as loading by tidal 
movements, subsidence due to natural ground compression, diurnal temperature and 
atmospheric changes, the study (Anon. 2007) concluded that relative sea level rise 
equates to a year-on-year 2-3 mm increase. Using these data the BGS produced a 
Thames region map that showed domains of movement. Close to the estuary, this 
relative subsidence is in the range -1.5 to -2.5 mm per year whilst adjacent but 
widespread areas record relative subsidence movements of between -0.75 to -1.5 mm 
per year. 
 
Whereas the EA engineers had a good understanding of their flood protection 
installations in terms of construction, it was generally recognised that the subsurface 
underlying these structures was far less well understood. In particular, there were 
concerns about the potential loading implications should remediation/refurbishing 
priorities dictate that sections of flood embankments needed significant height increases 
to accommodate anticipated water level rises. Allied to this concern was the knowledge 
that many kilometres of soil embankments (‘soft’ defences) were constructed with 
material sourced from linear ‘borrow’ trenches immediately adjacent to the ‘dry’ side of 
the embankment. What this soil material comprised was not always known except in 
those sections where repairs had been recently undertaken. It was appreciated that 
embankments of clay-rich material are susceptible to swelling and shrinking. Over time, 
cracks and fissures resulting from this natural process potentially leads to the loss of 
structural integrity of the embankment. 
 
Sourcing and getting-to-site additional construction material is also another significant 
consideration – could material be taken from existing adjacent trenches without 
compromising the integrity of the existing embankment and, importantly, the planned for 
increased height embankment? Could the ground beneath the new, raised structure 
sustain the increased loading? What was the likelihood and extent of differential 
settlement? Key to addressing these questions was an improved understanding of the 
Holocene sequence beneath the installations – a sequence known to variably comprise 
up to three layers of compressible peat, interbedded with saturated, estuarine muds. 
  
The terms of reference for the BGS's investigation were to: 
 review geological and geotechnical data held in the BGS archives 
 produce a geological and geotechnical appraisal of the ground beneath the flood 
defence structures 
 include a summary geotechnical literature review 
 make recommendations about possible further work based on an evaluation of 
the quality and distribution of the information reviewed. 
The main output of the completed work comprised eleven GIS layers of geological and 
geotechnical data for a 500 m wide buffer zone along 235 km of flood defence 
structures (Table 3). Key base level information, along with geotechnical interpretations 
based on an analysis of the data, is presented in the form of cross sections of 47 long 
sections of the flood defences, each 5 km in length (Figure 3). This information provided 
a background for the assessment of potential ground instability beneath existing River 
Thames’ flood defence structures and indicated those areas where more detailed site 
specific assessments were needed should modifications of the defence structures be 
planned. 
 
Table 3. Attributed GIS layers of information 
Layer Name Description 
Buffer 250 m  
A 250m wide buffer either side of the defence line.  This 
is the spatial basis for this project and provides a 500m 
corridor within which geological and geotechnical 
information held was presented. 
Current flood defences 
(hard and soft structures) 
Current position of flood defences in the Thames 
Estuary (Environment Agency).   
Geology_ bedrock 1:50 000 scale solid geology within the 500m corridor. 
Geology_superficial 
1:50 000 scale superficial geology within the 500m 
corridor. 
Geology_artificial 1:50 000 scale artificial geology (e.g. made ground, 
Layer Name Description 
worked ground etc.) within the 500m corridor. 
Boreholes 
Location of borehole records (7307 records) held by 
BGS that fall within the 500m corridor.   
Selected_Boreholes 
Boreholes records used for correlating geological cross-
sections (520 records). 
Geotech_Info_BHs 
Borehole records for which geotechnical data exists 
within the BGS Geotechnical Database.   
Engineering_Desc_BHs 
Boreholes for which engineering descriptions exist 
within the BGS Geotechnical Database.   
SI_Reports 
Relevant site investigation reports held in the BGS 
Geotechnical Database.    
Cross_Sections* 
A line layer based on the flood defence line divided up 
into 47 approximately 5 km long sections; 27 on the 
north bank (N1 to N27) and 20 on the southern bank 
(S1 to S20).  Within the GIS environment, each section 
is hyper-linked to a relevant geological cross-section. 
In-house modelling software (GSi3D) was used to construct the cross-sections (Ford et 
al. 2010). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Targeting the user-group 
The common challenge experienced in providing 
geological/geohazard/geoenvironmental audits is effective communication to the user-
group audience. Generally, this audience falls into four categories: 
1. High level planning and management who need information for investment 
decisions. 
2. Project Manager(s) who need detail for various design and construction phases 
of the project. 
3. Third party consultees generally concerned with the environmental impact of the 
route proposals. 
4. The main works contractor involved in construction. The 
geohazard/environmental appraisals often form part of the ‘Invitation to Tender’ 
(ITT) documentation. As such, they will indicate known ‘difficult ground’ and 
minimise/avoid occurrences of ‘unforeseen ground conditions’, which may have 
significant cost implications. 
 
Thus, the primary concerns and the level of technical understanding of the various 
components of the audience are wide-ranging. It is essential that the presentation of 
factual data and interpretation(s) are clearly structured within the reports to facilitate use 
and comprehension by this audience. 
 
Route types 
Linear routes are either: 
 Pre-existing routes where a geological/geohazard/geoenvironmental audit is 
required as a legal requirement or to determine the likelihood of a problem should 
operating conditions change (strengthening of flood defence embankments) or to 
address a known problem where the cause and remedy is not clear (for example, 
soil embankment composition). 
 Future routes where the overall viability of the route is considered initially in a 
relatively large search area and, subsequently, within potential route corridors to 
determine the geological/geohazard impacts on each of the identified route corridor 
options and, thereby, produce a sequential order of preference. 
Geohazard implications for routing 
The general requirements of a geological/geohazard/geoenvironmental audit include: 
 assessment of the impacts of the geology, hydrology, hydrogeology  - the ground 
conditions – on the route selection and the construction and operation of the 
proposed linear structure; 
 assessment of the effect of the proposed linear structure on the local geology, 
hydrology and ground conditions (in other words, how they might be changed by the 
structure); 
 identification of conditions that pose significant constraints upon, or risks to, the 
successful, timely and cost effective completion of the project and, subsequently, the 
safe operation and maintenance of the proposed linear structure; 
 recommendation of any mitigation measures (including the geographical extent of 
such mitigation measures) should they be needed along the route. 
 
Presentation of the geological/geohazard/geoenvironmental audit results 
The authors' experience of providing geological/geohazard/geoenvironmental audits has 
shown that some of the users can be overwhelmed by the amount of information and 
the technical terminology presented in these reports. Clearly, it is important that the 
audits are not just part of standard data gathering exercise – the information should be 
tailored for the engineer or planner for whom it was intended and the geotechnical or 
environmental implications presented simply and clearly.  
 
Notwithstanding the rapid advances in computing technology and the flexibility of data 
manipulation provided by GIS systems, providing information that the audience can 
usefully assimilate remains a challenge. One approach is to illustrate the information 
schematically (Figure 4). In this way the user, whatever their interest in the proposed 
scheme, is able to readily access data relevant to their needs. Ideally, this schematic 
‘high level’ index should be hyper-linked to increasingly detailed information on each 
topic including a glossary of technical terms perhaps not familiar to the user. 
 
The cost-benefits of such an approach are obvious; in particular, the scheme can be 
configured to address a crucial element of the management decision-making chain, 
namely, that of the financial managers (highlighted in Figure 4). If difficult technical 
considerations are anticipated the scheme enables these issues to be ‘flagged up’ 
during the early phases; thus, these difficulties can be considered in terms of their 
impact on logistics, duration of the construction and, of course, the overall budget.  
 
Developments in the provision of digital data 
The main holders of spatial geological data in most countries are geological surveys 
and their equivalents. The last two decades have seen the rapid digitisation of these 
holdings in many geological surveys. However, these data, which consist of a range of 
specific datasets, are not necessarily directly useful to the specific needs of individuals 
and organisations. In recent years, there has been increased efforts to develop 
'products' based on the geological and other datasets that address the specific 
requirements of users. In particular, these 'products' might include suitability maps to 
provide a ‘screening level’ indication of the suitability of the subsurface for a particular 
purpose. Examples include digital spatial data tools showing the suitability of the ground 
for the use of ground source heat pumps, for contaminated site evaluation and 
prioritisation and for the use of sustainable drainage systems (SuDS) (Dearden & Price 
2011, 2012, Dearden et al. 2013). 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Example of a GIS hyper-linked cross section 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic diagram presenting comprehensive meta-data route information; 
specific data and interpretations that can be accessed by a range of users by means of 
hyper-links. 
 
Most of the datasets that are available at the BGS are derived wholly, or in part, from 
the BGS’s 1: 50 000 scale Digital Geological Map, DiGMapGB 50 (BGS, 2010). Over 
the past 10 years, re-attribution of the geological map polygons with a range of property 
data has resulted in a number of directly derived datasets (including permeability, 
geological indicators of flooding, swelling clays, collapsible ground, compressible 
ground, running sands and aquifer predominant flow mechanism) and more complex 
derived datasets (including landslides, soluble rocks and susceptibility to groundwater 
flooding). The latter were developed using algorithms to combine data from the digital 
geological map and other data sources, including for example, digital terrain models and 
borehole data (Walsby 2007). 
 
However, it does not follow that an organisation such as the BGS, which has spent 
much of its almost 180 year existence acquiring, validating and managing geological 
data, is, necessarily, best placed to decide what types of derived and interpreted 
datasets users might need and want. Consequently, systems are now being developed 
to help users create, on-line from the existing data and information holdings, outputs 
that more exactly meet their needs. The BGS has developed a means of doing this that 
is called the 'Online Suitability Map Generator' (OSMG); this provides an assessment of 
ground conditions for any application (within reason), by generating bespoke summary 
maps and component maps. One such application could be information for pipeline 
planning or maintenance. The OSMG has three parts: 
 data searching to find the dataset(s) the user needs; the objective is to create a 
web-based facility that connects the user’s purpose or question (for example, 'I 
need to build a pipeline from location a to location b; what natural and artificial 
geohazards are known along the route?), with the datasets that will help provide 
a screening-level solution; 
 user-defined assignment of suitability scores to the hazard ratings of each 
geohazard dataset indicating the users’ assessment of suitability/susceptibility; 
 generation of bespoke suitability maps. 
 
Systems such as the OSMG require high quality and medium scale (that is, 1:25 000 to 
1:100 000) data and information at a regional or national level, though in very large 
countries, it is likely that the availability of data and information is likely to be at much 
smaller scales. However, OSMG points the way to how a wide range of users of 
geological knowledge might obtain the information that they need and in the form that 
they want, quickly, easily and remotely in the near-future. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Historically, the key role of geological surveys and equivalent organisations has been 
the collection, management and interpretation of geological data and its presentation in 
the form of maps, memoirs and reports. However, the rapid increase in the ease of both 
collecting and copying spatial data digitally has led to the development of information 
systems that can provide spatial interpretations of the data for a range of potential users 
and uses. However, such systems, to be of use, require that the data are 
comprehensive and, preferably, at a medium scale. For some long-established 
geological surveys, these requirements have largely been met and so digital, spatial 
information systems are becoming available. 
 
For the construction and the maintenance of pipelines, which are constructed below or 
on the ground surface, there is a need for geological information to inform designers 
and constructors about, for example, the ease of excavation, the depth to the 
groundwater table, susceptibility to flooding and susceptibility to geohazards that might 
affect the construction and operation of a pipeline. An information system for identifying 
risks from landslides and dissolution has been developed for Great Britain's natural gas 
and ethylene pipeline distribution networks. The information system is based on a 
landslide and dissolution susceptibility interpretation of the national, geological maps at 
a scale of 1:50 000. This interpretation allowed the pipeline operators to meet their 
obligations to understand the risk of pipeline rupture from these geohazard events. 
 
Geological information was also needed for the Thames Estuary flood defence system, 
which consists of almost 250 km of flood embankments. If projections of sea-level rise 
are correct, some, at least, of the embankments will need to be heightened. However, 
the increased loads on soft, compressible alluvial deposits may make the embankments 
settle. Consequently, there was a need for an assessment of this susceptibility. The 
information was presented as a series of annotated cross sections. This assessment 
has led to the development of simplified proforma that can provide non-geological 
project managers with a first-pass explanation of lengths of linear infrastructure routes 
that may be more hazardous and hence involve greater costs. 
 
In the future, it is likely that the interpreted information from the original datasets will not 
be provided prescriptively. Rather, systems will be devised which allow users to dip into 
the datasets and develop their own information sets that are relevant to the specific 
questions that they need to answer. 
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